The Federalist No. 1 - General Introduction
Federalist No. 1 - General Introduction
General Introduction
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
After clear evidence of the inefficiency of the existing federal government, you are now called upon to consider a new Constitution for the United States of America. The importance of this subject speaks for itself; its consequences involve nothing less than the existence of the Union, the safety and well-being of its parts, and the fate of an empire that is, in many respects, the most interesting in the world. It has often been remarked that it seems to have been left to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question of whether societies of people are truly capable of establishing good government through reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend on accident and force for their political constitutions. If there’s any truth in this remark, the crisis we have reached may rightly be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong choice in the part we shall play may, in this view, deserve to be considered a general misfortune for humanity.
This idea adds the motivations of philanthropy to those of patriotism, heightening the concern that all thoughtful and good people must feel for the outcome. It would be fortunate if our choice were guided by a wise assessment of our true interests, unconfused and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is something more to be wished for than seriously expected. The plan offered for our deliberations affects too many specific interests, changes too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of matters unrelated to its merits, along with views, passions, and prejudices not favorable to the discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable obstacles the new Constitution will have to face can easily be identified: the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes that may risk a reduction of the power, income, and importance of the offices they hold under State establishments; and the distorted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to elevate themselves through the confusions of their country or will flatter themselves with better prospects of advancement from the division of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government.
It is not my intention, however, to dwell on observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be dishonest to attribute indiscriminately the opposition of any group of men (merely because their situations might make them suspect) to selfish or ambitious motives. Fairness obliges us to admit that even such men may be driven by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition that has appeared, or may hereafter appear, will spring from sources blameless at least, if not respectable—the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived suspicions and fears. So numerous and powerful are the causes that serve to mislead judgment that we often see wise and good men on the wrong as well as the right side of questions of the greatest importance to society. This fact, if properly considered, would teach moderation to those who are utterly convinced of their being right in any controversy. A further reason for caution, in this respect, might come from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their opponents. Ambition, greed, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives no more commendable than these, are likely to influence those who support as well as those who oppose the right side of a question. Even without these reasons for moderation, nothing could be more ill-advised than that intolerant spirit which has always characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making converts by force. Heresies in either field can rarely be cured by persecution.
And yet, however correct these sentiments may be, we already have sufficient indications that it will happen in this case as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malicious passions will be unleashed. Judging from the conduct of the opposing parties, we might conclude that they will mutually hope to prove the correctness of their opinions and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declarations and the bitterness of their attacks. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temperament fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An overly suspicious fear of danger to the rights of the people, which is more often the fault of the mind than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and trickery—the old bait for popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on one hand, that jealousy is the usual companion of love, and that the noble enthusiasm for liberty is prone to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will equally be forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the view of sound and well-informed judgment, their interests can never be separated; and that dangerous ambition more often hides behind the plausible mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain path to the introduction of despotism than the latter and that among those who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number began their careers by paying an obsequious court to the people—starting as demagogues and ending as tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations, I have aimed, my fellow citizens, to warn you against all attempts, from any quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost importance to your welfare by any impressions other than those that may result from the evidence of truth. You will no doubt, at the same time, have gathered from the general direction of these observations that they come from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I admit to you that after giving it careful consideration, I am clearly of the opinion that it is in your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I do not pretend to hold back feelings I do not have. I will not entertain you with an appearance of deliberation when I have already decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions and will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are based. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply declarations on this point. My motives must remain in the repository of my own heart. My arguments will be open to all and may be judged by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit that will not disgrace the cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following important points:
1. The utility of the Union to your political prosperity
2. The insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve that Union
3. The necessity of a government at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to achieve this objective
4. The conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true principles of republican government
5. Its similarity to your own State constitution
6. And lastly, the additional security its adoption will provide for the preservation of that type of government, for liberty, and for property
As we progress in this discussion, I will endeavor to provide satisfactory answers to all the objections that have appeared and that may seem to deserve your attention.
It may perhaps be thought unnecessary to offer arguments to prove the utility of the Union—a point undoubtedly deeply engraved on the hearts of the great majority of the people in every State, and one which, it might be imagined, has no opponents. But the fact is that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution that the thirteen States are too extensive for any general system, and that we must necessarily resort to separate confederacies of distinct parts of the whole.¹ This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually spread until it has enough supporters to allow an open declaration of it. For nothing can be more evident to those who are able to take a broad view of the subject than the alternative of adopting the new Constitution or dismembering the Union. It will, therefore, be useful to begin by examining the advantages of that Union and the certain evils and probable dangers to which every State will be exposed by its dissolution. This will accordingly be the subject of my next address.
PUBLIUS